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1. Introduction 
Although the concept of corporate governance is relevant to all firms in all countries, it 
has no globally accepted single definition. A generally agreed definition is “the system 
by which firms are directed and controlled,” considering both internal governance 
elements based on agency theory and external control elements on the grounds of 
stakeholder theory. When there is a separation between the control of firms and 
ownership, agency problems occur—firm management (agents) in charge of day to day 
operations of the firm may not act in the best interests of the firm’s owners (principals) 
(Bearle and Means, 1932). To solve agency problems, some researchers (Alchian, 1950; 
Jensen, 1988) argue that product market competition pressurizes managers to act with 
self-discipline; while Jensen (1993) suggests enhancing the roles of directorial boards 
and large shareholders. Stakeholder theory addresses not only the relationship between 
the firm and its owners, but also a wide range of other stakeholders, such as employees, 
customers, creditors, and government (Maher and Andersson, 1999). Gillan (2006) 
develops a broader framework of corporate governance in terms of internal governance 
and external governance. Internal governance is made up of five aspects—the role, 
structure and incentives of the Board of Directors; managerial incentives; capital 
structure; bylaws and charter provision and internal control systems. External 
governance also covers five dimensions—laws and regulations; markets for capital, 
corporate control, labour, and product; capital market information provision; external 
accounting, financial and legal services, and private sources of external oversight (i.e. 
the media and external lawsuits).  
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The effectiveness of corporate governance is largely determined by ownership structure 
and it, in turn, affects performance. The connection between corporate governance, 
ownership structure, and performance has been the subject of a long and ongoing debate 
in the economics and corporate finance literature. In the banking industry, the issue of 
corporate governance becomes more complicated than in other industries due to a 
number of factors, including the level and quality of bank regulation and supervision, 
the opaque nature of banks assets, the state of market development and the institutional 
environment (Levine, 2004).  
 
In the corporate finance literature, a firm’s performance is usually measured using 
accounting-based profitability measures (e.g. ROA and ROE), market-based ratios (e.g. 
total shareholder return, price-earnings ratio, and dividend yield) and cash flow-based 
measures (e.g. free cash flow, cash flow per share).  These measures are subject to 
limitations as accounting data can be easily manipulated and share prices are affected by 
many factors. Efficiency is considered a more sophisticated measure of performance 
since it is derived from firms’ inputs and outputs. In the bank efficiency literature, 
corporate governance is mainly examined under the framework of ownership and 
performance. The primary concern is to find the optimal ownership and management 
structure which can better solve the principal-agent problem (Spong et al. 1995).  
 
Ownership structure has two dimensions: the degree of ownership concentration and the 
nature of the owners (Iannotta et al., 2007). As to the effect of ownership concentration 
on performance, there are different opinions.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as 
managers’ equity share decreases and ownership becomes more dispersed, agency costs 
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associated with a deviation from value maximization increase. In contrast, Fama (1980) 
suggests that although listed firms tend to have a low degree of ownership concentration, 
an efficient capital market is likely to discipline the firm’s management. In fact, listed 
banks under capital market discipline and monitoring are empirically found to be more 
efficient than unlisted ones (Berger and Mester, 1997). Moreover, large shareholders 
may benefit from their control over management at the expense of minority 
shareholders’ interests.  In such a case, minority shareholders’ interests should be 
protected by the legal system to maintain their confidence (OECD, 2004). Ianotta et al. 
(2007) find ownership concentration has no significant effects on banks’ profitability 
but is associated with better loan quality and lower asset and insolvency risks.   
 
Firms with the same degree of concentration but a different nature of owners may 
perform differently from one another. State ownership theoretically means all citizens 
are co-owners who in practice have no power and no incentive to influence and monitor 
the management of state firms, leaving government as the only effective representative 
agent (Huibers 2005). Governments, however, have multiple (often conflicting) goals 
other than profit maximization. These state-owned firms are run by bureaucrats who 
“have extremely concentrated control rights but no significant cash flow right” (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Meanwhile, there exists a lack of market discipline in inefficient 
state firms (they are less likely to go bankrupt) and inadequate means of punishing 
managing bureaucrats for wrong-doings. In contrast, private ownership is expected to 
reduce agency problems and improve performance based on the property rights 
literature (Alchian, 1965). Shareholders exercise due diligence and monitor 
management performance. The management of private banks face a pressure to improve 
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performance as inefficient management can be replaced and banks may go bankrupt 
when facing financial distress. In the banking industry, state ownership has been 
prevalent in both developed and developing countries in the past based on the argument 
that governments have been able to channel funds into sectors and projects with low 
financial but high social returns. However, empirical research generally reports that 
state-owned banks underperform their private counterparts (Bonin et al., 2005a; Fries 
and Taci, 2005; Iannotta et al., 2007; and Yao et al., 2007).  
 
Foreign ownership comes in two forms: foreign majority ownership (foreign banks) and 
foreign minority ownership in domestic banks. There are two contrasting views on the 
performance of foreign banks. The home field advantage hypothesis argues that 
domestic banks are generally more efficient than foreign-owned institutions due to 
organizational diseconomies to operate and monitor from a distance and limited access 
to local soft qualitative information. The global advantage hypothesis argues that 
foreign institutions can be more efficient because of superior managerial skills and high 
quality human capital inherited from foreign owners (Berger et al. 2000).  The home 
field advantage hypothesis tends to hold in developed countries while the global 
advantage hypothesis holds in developing countries (Claessens et al., 2001). Foreign 
minority ownership in domestic banks is expected to have a positive performance effect 
by bringing in advanced technology, modern banking techniques and superior 
managerial skills. Empirical studies (i.e. Bonin et al., 2005b, Berger et al., 2009) 
suggest improvements in performance after foreign investment in domestic banks. 
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In China, the central government initiated gradual banking reform in the early 1980s. 
The reform was accelerated from 2003, focusing on optimizing bank ownership 
structure to improve corporate governance, strengthen internal control mechanisms and 
risk management systems. In fact, building up well-functioning corporate governance is 
the key to the success of Chinese banking reform. To safeguard achievements in 
ownership and corporate governance reforms, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) set out ten requirements for good corporate governance 
benchmarking the top 100 largest banks globally. These requirements cover corporate 
governance structure, diversified ownership, the goal of profit maximization, prudent 
accounting practices, and market-oriented human resource management 
(www.cbrc.gov.cn). After more than three decades of reform, the ownership structure 
and corporate governance issue have become more relevant than ever before. It is of 
great interest to empirically examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
bank performance, thereby providing for policy makers evidence for formulating future 
reform strategy.  
 
Despite the growing interests of researchers worldwide in the Chinese banking industry, 
there is little research on bank corporate governance, perhaps due to the lack of detailed 
data on standard corporate governance variables relating to Boards of Directors. Lin and 
Zhang (2009) examine the impact of bank ownership reform on bank performance 
(where bank performance is measured by simple accounting ratios) over the period 
1997-2004. They find state ownership is associated with lower profitability and poorer 
asset quality.  Jiang et al. (2009) investigate the effect of changes in corporate 
governance on bank technical efficiency and their findings are similar to Lin and Zhang 
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(2009) that state-owned banks are the least efficient banks. But, unlike Lin and Zhang 
(2009) who found no performance improvement after governance changes, Jiang et al. 
(2009) observed some favourable efficiency effects brought about by changes in 
corporate governance. The present study extends existing bank corporate governance 
literature by considering both ownership concentration and the nature of bank owners 
(including foreign majority and minority ownership), while controlling for bank risk 
taking characteristics in terms of credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and capital risk.  
 
Employing a one-step SFA model, this paper examines the impact of corporate 
governance on bank profit efficiency for 47 banks in China over the period 1995-2008. 
Following literature (Berger et al., 2005 and Williams and Nguyen, 2005), different 
ownership structures are employed to capture differences in corporate governance. We 
find that bank efficiency has improved significantly with a mean of 60 per cent. 
Examining the nature of owners, banks with majority foreign ownership are the most 
profitable while those with majority state ownership are the most unprofitable. 
Moreover, we find no evidence that foreign minority ownership improves bank 
efficiency. Looking into ownership concentration, banks with more dispersed ownership 
are found to be more efficient.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the Chinese 
banking system and banking reform. Section 3 outlines research methods. Section 4 
analyzes empirical results and section 5 concludes.   
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2. Brief history of Chinese banking system and its reform 
In the late 1970s, the Chinese banking system entered into a reform period that aimed to 
create a multi-ownership, competitive and market-oriented banking system. This period 
can be sub-divided into four stages. The first stage was an initial institutional 
restructuring period during 1979-1984, beginning with the creation of a two-tier 
banking system. The People’s Bank of China became the central bank and the 
commercial banking operations were taken over by four specialized state-owned banks 
(known as the “Big Four”): the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) undertook rural 
banking business; the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC, established in 
1984) focused on commercial banking activities in urban areas; the People’s 
Construction Bank of China (later renamed as China Construction Bank Corporation—
CCBC) dealt with government fixed assets investment and urban large construction 
projects;  and  the Bank of China (BOC) conducted foreign currency transactions.  
 
The subsequent reform was to deepen institutional restructuring during the 1985-1994 
period. Foreign banks and domestic joint-stock banks were allowed to enter into the 
market, diversifying bank ownership structure. Most nationwide or regional joint stock 
commercial banks (JSCBs) were launched with shareholding ownership structures—an 
institutional breakthrough in banking industry. However, the “Big Four” still dominated 
the banking system and played a strong role in promoting economic growth and 
maintaining stability.   
 
The third stage of banking reform was the commercialization of banks during 1995-
2002. The year 1995 marked the beginning of bank commercialization when the Law of 
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the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks was enacted. The “Big Four” 
were legally defined as state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and their policy 
lending functions were taken away by the three newly established policy 
banks.1However, these policy banks lacked branch networks and capital as well as 
serving and lending capacity and they were unable to meet the needs of policy lending 
functions which were previously performed by the “Big Four.” Moreover, central and 
local governments frequently intervened in the operations of “Big Four,” resulting in a 
huge number of NPLs. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy experienced overheating and 
the transitional reform of state-owned enterprises was deepened in the 1990s. NPLs 
grew even faster while bank capital adequacy ratios declined steadily. By 1999, SOCBs 
became financially insolvent and the banking system became rather vulnerable. Perhaps 
awakened by South East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the central government 
launched the first round of SOCBs bailouts in 1998-1999 to treat its ailing banking 
system. Despite a capital injection into SOCBs of RMB 270 billion in 1998 and an 
offloading of RMB 1.4 trillion of NPLs from the SOCBs, the reform did not address the 
corporate governance issue which were the root cause of problems in the Chinese 
banking system. 
 
In the mid-1990s, City Commercial Banks (CCBs) were created by way of restructuring 
and consolidating former urban credit cooperatives. CCBs adopted a shareholding 
ownership structure and were restricted geographically within their own localities. 
Capital was provided by urban enterprises and local governments. CCBs mainly serve 
small and medium-sized enterprises, collectives and local residents in their 
                                               
1
 Namely the China Development Bank, the Import-Export Bank of China, and the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China 
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municipalities.  These CCBs flourished and were allowed case by case to expand into 
other regions since early this century. 
 
In 2003, the central government initiated more radical banking reforms to modernize the 
banking system in response to China’s WTO entry in 2001. Using the state’s massive 
foreign exchange reserves, the government sequently injected capital to and tripped off 
NPLs from major commercial banks, including BOC, CCBC, Bank of Communication, 
ICBC, and ABC. After financial restructuring, these banks were partially privatised by 
attracting foreign investors and/or undergoing IPOs on the Shanghai and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchanges. Both foreign investors and the capital market reacted highly 
positively. Foreign investors have invested in all types of domestic banks (SOCB, JSCB 
and CCBs) and some listed banks’ share prices rocketed by more than 100% in the 
capital market. Following ICBC becoming the largest bank in the world with a market 
capitalization of $246 billion in July 2007, ABC became the world’s largest first-time 
share sale with an IPO raising $22.1 billion in July 2010. These reforms have resulted in 
significant changes in corporate governance in the banking industry.  
 
Along with institutional and financial restructuring, a series of comprehensive and 
concrete reforms were implemented to liberalize the financial market and strengthen a 
prudent regulatory and supervisory framework. Actions have included the removal of 
credit quotas in 1998, the introduction of capital adequacy requirements, adoption of an 
internationally accepted five-category loan classification system, reduction in NPLs and 
so forth. By ‘touching stones to cross the river,’ banking reform has achieved 
considerable progresses. By 2009, a multi-layered banking system has taken shape, 
11 
 
comprising of a central bank of the PBC, a regulatory and supervisory body of the 
CBRC, four partially privatized SOCBs, 13 JSCBs, 112 CCBs, FBs, along with a vast 
number of other small financial institutions. The total banking assets and liabilities 
reached RMB 78 trillion and RMB 74 trillion, respectively (CBRC annual report, 2009). 
 
3. Methodologies, model specification and data 
The preferred estimation technique is SFA, developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1977). SFA pre-specifies a functional form and decomposes error terms into a random 
error ( iv ) and inefficiency ( iu ). It assumes that inefficiencies follow an asymmetrical 
half-normal distribution and random errors follow a symmetric standard normal 
distribution. The SFA is criticized for its pre-specified functional form and 
distributional assumptions. However, Fries and Taci (2005) suggest that the SFA that 
separates random errors and inefficiencies is more appropriate over the non-parametric 
method in transition and developing countries where problems of measurement errors 
and uncertain economic environments are more likely to prevail.  
 
This paper adopts a one-step model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). It is 
assumed that non-negative inefficiencies are a function of firm-specific variables and 
they are independently distributed as truncations of normal distributions with constant 
variance but with means that are a linear function of observable variables. A commonly 
employed two-step procedure involves estimating a cost and/or profit frontier to derive 
inefficiencies in the first step and then to regresses the estimated inefficiencies against a 
set of possible determinants in the second step. This two-step procedure suffers from 
serious econometric problems. For instance, inefficiencies are assumed to be identically 
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distributed in the first step but they are assumed to have a functional relationship with a 
set of variables in the second stage (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000).  
 
This paper prefers an alternative profit efficiency measure for following reasons. First, 
profit efficiency is based on economic foundations accounting for not only the use of 
technology in the production process but also the production optimization for the given 
market prices and competition conditions (Berger and Mester, 1997). Second, an 
alternative profit frontier assumes that banks can exercise a degree of market power in 
setting output prices (Berger and Mester, 1997). Finally, profit efficiency is considered 
to be a better performance measure since cost efficiency can be biased if NPLs cannot 
be controlled for. 
 
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model for estimating an alternative profit frontier is 
shown in Equation (1)  
ititittit uvxty lnlnln 0 −+++= βββ  ,  i=1, …, N; t=1,…,T,                   (1) 
where i and t denote firm and time; ityln  is the logarithm of the profit of the i-th firm; 
itx  is a k×1 vector of the logarithm of input prices and output of the i-th firm; itV  a 
random variable assumed to be iid. N (0, 2vσ ) and independent of itU ; itU  are profit 
inefficiency, which are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of 
the N ( itm , 2uσ ) distribution; β  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 
 
Equation (2) shows the inefficiency effects model  
itittit Wztm +++= δδδ 0                             (2) 
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where itz  is a vector of explanatory variables associated with profit inefficiency over 
time; itW is a random variable defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with 
zero mean and variance 2σ ; δ  is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The empirical specification of the alternative profit frontier in translog form is shown in 
Equation (3). 
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where Пit is the profit of a bank in a given year; iY   are  outputs; kW are input prices; 
rZ is fixed netputs; T is a time trend; itv  are identical and independently distributed 
random errors, which are independent of itu ; itu  are non-negative inefficiencies; nX are 
adjusted values of logged outputs so that they fall within the interval 
]29.0,21.0[ pipi ×× 2  and banda,,,,,,,,,, ησκϖτφψβα are parameters to be 
estimated.  
 
                                               
2 )/ln( 2zYi  are rescaled so that each nx term falls into the interval [0,2pi]. Following Berger and Mester (1997), each 
end of the interval [0,2pi] are cut off by 10% so that nx to span the interval of ]29.0,21.0[ pipi ××  for reducing 
approximation problems near the endpoints. According to Berger and Mester (1997), the rescaling formula is 
)/ln(2.0 2zYa iiii ×+×− µµ where [a, b] is the range of )/ln( 2zYi  over the entire 11-year time interval, 
and )/()21.029.0( iii ab −×−×= pipiµ . 
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The standard restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by normalizing 
the profits and input prices by one arbitrarily chosen input price—the price of fund. 
Total profits, output variables and netputs are normalized by total assets to control for 
scale biases and heteroskedasticity.  
The empirical inefficiency effect model is shown in Equation (4). 
it
b
itbita
a
it GDPtRiskCGu εδδδδδ +++++= ∑∑
==
1110
9
6
5
1
0                          (4)                                 
where itCG is a vector of governance indicators; Riskit is a vector of risk indicators 
controlling for differences in risk taking behaviours across banks; t is a time trend; and 
GDP is a proxy for the macroeconomic environment.  
 
Employing a modified version of the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley 
1977), this paper defines three outputs—total loans, other earning assets, and deposits; 
two inputs—cost of fund and cost of labour; and one netput—equity. Theoretically, the 
price of labour and the price of physical capital should be measured separately. Due to 
the lack of separate data on labour (i.e. personnel expenses), the price of labour and 
physical capital is defined as the ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets as in 
Hasan and Marton (2003). The price of funds is defined as the ratio of total interest 
expenses to total interest bearing funds. Data are collected from BankScope 
complemented by the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1986-2009) and the 
China Statistical Yearbook (1996-2009). The unbalanced sample includes 47 
commercial banks operating in China for the period 1995-2008 with 481 observations. 
These banks are classified into four main categories according to the nature of owners: 
SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs, and foreign banks (FBs). Table 1 provides the summary 
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statistics. Comparing data in 1997 and 2008, the means and standard deviations of all 
variables increased while average prices of labour and fund decreased.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
There are 12 explanatory variables in the inefficiency effect model: 5 indicators 
representing the nature of owners, 1 capturing ownership concentration, 4 controlling 
for risk takings, 1 year trend variable and GDP growth. CCB is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the bank is a regional city commercial bank and zero otherwise. JSCB is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a national wide joint-stock commercial bank 
and zero otherwise. SOCB is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a state-
owned commercial bank (with majority state ownership) and zero otherwise. FB is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a foreign bank (with majority foreign 
ownership) and zero otherwise. For-Minority is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
bank has foreign minority ownership regardless of its original ownership nature and 
zero otherwise. LIST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is listed on a stock 
market and zero otherwise. Following Iannotta et al. (2007), this dummy is used as a 
proxy for ownership concentration. Capital risk is the natural logarithm of equity to 
total asset ratio. Credit risk is the natural logarithm of loan loss reserve to gross loan 
ratio. Market risk is the natural logarithm of interbank interest to interest on deposit. 
Liquidity risk is the natural logarithm of gross loan to customer deposits ratio. t is a year 
trend dummy. GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP growth rate, controlling for the 
macroeconomic environment in which banks operate.  
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5. Empirical results 
Estimation results of the alternative profit frontier are reported in Table 2. We have also 
tested a few alternative specifications and regression results are robust. For brevity, only 
this final version of specification is reported.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The estimated γ is 0.86, indicating that a large part of the total composite error term is 
attributable to inefficiency. The LR test statistic is 238, confirming the existence of a 
one-sided error within the composite error term. The mean profit efficiency is estimated 
at 61 per cent, suggesting banks on average earn 39 per cent less than the maximum 
possible profit earned by a best practice bank using the same bundle of inputs under the 
same conditions.  
 
As shown in Figure 1, the mean profit efficiency increased steadily by 62 per cent from 
20 per cent in 1995 to 82 per cent in 2007 and dropped in 2008 by 6 per cent signifying 
the impact of the worldwide financial crisis in 2008-2009. These efficiency gains are 
attributable to two main reasons: (1) two rounds of off-loading of NPLs from major 
commercial banks in 1999 and in 2003-2010, which significantly improved bank asset 
quality and therefore profitability; and (2) improvement in bank management and 
operational skills as well as management awareness of profit maximisation after three 
decades of reform.  
[Figure 1 here] 
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Results from the inefficiency effect model (reported in Table 3) are of particular interest 
as they offer insights into the effects of corporate governance on performance thereby 
providing information for policy makers regarding the ongoing banking reform in China.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
CCB is excluded from the regression so that the estimated coefficients of FB, JSCB and 
SOCB measure the effect of each ownership structure on performance relative to CCBs. 
Our results show that the nature of owners has significant impacts on bank performance. 
Both JSCB ( 1δ ) and SOCB ( 2δ ) are statistically significant at the 1% level and both 
have positive signs, indicating JSCBs and SOCBs are less profitable than CCBs. In 
other words, CCBs are the most efficient domestic banks. A caveat is that this result 
may be overestimated and the actual average performance of CCBs would be lower. 
Our sample includes only 25 CCBs out of 112 for those whose data are available for at 
least five years. It is argued that banks with better management and performance are 
more likely to make data publicly available. On the other hand, these 25 CCBs are the 
most influential ones with total assets counting for more than half of the total asset of 
112 CCBs in 2008. The estimated coefficient for SOCB is 2.1 and that for JSCB is 0.97, 
implying that SOCBs are twice as inefficient than JSCBs. In fact, SOCBs are the least 
efficient banks, consistent with mainstream literature regarding state ownership.  
 
FB ( 3δ ) is statistically significant at the 10% level with a negative sign, suggesting that 
foreign banks are more efficient than CCBs that are the most profitable domestic banks. 
This result provides weak evidence for the global advantage hypothesis that foreign 
institutions seems to take advantage of their superior managerial skills and high quality 
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human capital (Berger et al., 2000). It is consistent with Berger et al. (2009) who found 
foreign banks to be the most efficient in China and Claessens et al. (2001) who 
document the tendency for the global advantage hypothesis to hold in developing 
countries. However, the findings need to be interpreted with caution as foreign banks in 
China had been subject to several operational and geographical restrictions and a high 
level of entry barriers. In the early 1980s, the Chinese government opened the door of 
financial market, but just a crack, to foreign financial institutions. Foreign banks were 
first allowed to open representative offices and subsequently permitted to open 
operational braches in Special Economic Zones. This geographical restriction was 
extended to 23 coastal cities in the first half of the 1990s and foreign banks were 
allowed to open branches across China in 1996. Foreign banks were still restricted to 
serving foreign companies and residents and to conduct foreign currency business only. 
China’s entry to the WTO implied a gradual removal of these barriers and restrictions in 
five years and foreign banks started to compete with domestic banks at the same playing 
field from the end of 2006.  
 
Figure 2 plots the mean profit efficiency by the nature of owners, which shows the trend 
and differences in bank performance with different ownership structures. Efficiency 
levels of all types of banks have improved with a converging trend. SOCBs are the least 
efficient banks and their average efficiency level was below 10 percent before the first 
round of bailout in 1999, and slowly reached 23 percent in 2002. Thereafter, as the 
government implemented more radical reforms, SOCBs enjoyed significant gains in 
efficiency which peaked at 80 per cent in 2007. JSCBs exhibited steady improvements 
in efficiency up to 2007, followed by a drop in 2008. The efficiency level of CCBs is 
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relatively stable, while that of FBs fluctuates drastically. Both FBs and CCBs seem to 
be resistant to the financial crisis, unlike JSCBs and SOCBs that suffered downward 
shocks in 2008 when financial crisis started.  
 [Figure 2 here] 
 
For-Minority ( 4δ ) is statistically insignificant in spite of a negative sign. In other words, 
banks with minority foreign ownership are not more profitable that those banks without 
foreign investment. This finding, however, is inconsistent with Berger et al. (2009) that 
find minority foreign ownership is associated with significantly improved efficiency. 
We consider this inconsistency due to the difference in sample period of two studies. 
Berger et al. (2009) cover the period 1994-2003, while foreign direct investment in the 
banking sector surged in 2004 and peaked in 2005. Before 2004, foreign investors were 
cautious and only took minority ownership in well-selected, outstanding JSCBs (i.e. 
Pudong Development Bank by CITI Group) and CCBs (i.e. Bank of Shanghai by 
HSBC). Most foreign minority shareholdings in domestic banks were taken up after 
2004. Our sample period is up to 2008, allowing us to depict a more complete picture 
regarding the impacts of foreign minority ownership on bank performance.  
 
The Chinese government has made considerable efforts to attract foreign strategic 
investors for its major banks, but the expected benefits from foreign minority ownership 
have not yet been shown. One possible reason is that after foreign owners take minority 
ownership, banks have undertaken more investing activities like upgrading technology 
and prudential practices such as more loan loss provision, which sacrifice profitability at 
present or in the near future but will benefit the banks in the long run. An alternative 
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explanation is that it takes more time to realise the potential benefits brought by foreign 
minority owners since superior managerial and operational skills cannot be transferred 
in a short time period. Moreover, the Chinese government has set upper limits for 
foreign ownership in domestic banks:  25 per cent for total foreign ownership and 20 
percent for a single foreign investor. For SOCBs, the central government holds a 
majority controlling stake. It is doubtful whether foreign investors have sufficient power 
and ability to influence the decision making processes so that they can apply their 
operational and managerial skills.  
 
The coefficient on LIST ( 5δ ) is statistically significant and negative. The implication is 
that banks with dispersed ownership structure are more efficient. This result seems in 
contradiction with the agency theory. However, some benefits, such as better risk-
bearing (Demsetz, 1983) and market discipline mechanisms, may have offset the agency 
costs arising from diffused ownership structure, making publically owned companies 
more successful.  
 
Moving on to banks’ risk taking characteristics, Capital Risk ( 6δ ) is insignificant and 
therefore has no impact on bank performance in China for the period under 
investigation. In fact, there is a trade-off between capital and profitability: the higher the 
capital to asset ratio, the lower the capital risk and profitability, holding other things 
equal. The ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loan is the proxy for credit risk. The higher 
the ratio, the higher is the credit risk. The coefficient on Credit Risk ( 7δ ) is significant 
at 10 percent level and positive, indicating that banks with higher credit risk are less 
efficient. The result is as expected— a higher ratio suggests a higher proportion of a 
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bank’s loan portfolio needs to be provided for and to be charged as an expense (loan 
loss provision) against total income. The interbank interest to interest on deposit ratio 
reflects the degree that a bank relies on interbank market as a source of funding. It 
measures the extent to which a bank is exposed to the risk of changes in market rates. 
The higher the ratio, the higher is the market risk faced by a bank. A positive and 
significant coefficient on Market Risk ( 8δ ) means that higher market risk is associated 
with poor performance. The proxy for bank liquidity risk is the ratio of gross loan to 
customer deposit and a higher ratio represents higher liquidity risk. A positive and 
significant coefficient on Liquidity Risk ( 9δ ) suggests that a bank facing higher 
liquidity risk suffers efficiency losses despite of the trade off between liquidity and 
profitability.  
   
The year trend variable ( 10δ ) in the inefficiency effect model captures temporal changes 
in inefficiency against the shifting frontier. The negative and significant coefficient 
reflects that banks profit efficiency improves as time passes. A healthy GDP growth 
( 11δ ) offers a favourable macroeconomic condition which has a positive impact on bank 
performance. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Chinese banking has undergone gradual reforms over the past 30 years, which 
nevertheless have witnessed the accumulation of significant changes in banks’ corporate 
governance structure. This paper has examined the effects of corporate governance on 
bank profit efficiency for 47 commercial banks operating in China for the period 1995-
2008. The dataset covers all the major commercial banks, hence providing sufficient 
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empirical evidence to test the hypotheses presented at the beginning of the paper. In 
particular, we have examined how the nature of owners and the concentration of the 
ownership have affected bank efficiency while controlling for banks risk taking 
behaviour and macroeconomic environment in which banks operate.  
 
On average, bank efficiency has improved significantly by 56 percent from 20 per cent 
in 1995 to 76 per cent in 2008. We find weak evidence for the global advantage 
hypothesis in China that foreign banks (with majority foreign ownership) are more 
efficient than domestic banks. Majority state ownership is associated with a rather low 
efficiency and SOCBs are the most unprofitable banks. This result provides strong 
empirical evidence for recent banking reforms of privatizing state-owned banks in 
China. The policy implication is that the current reform is in the right direction. 
Nevertheless, fundamental change in bank management and operations is a complex 
process. The real impacts of privatisation remain to be seen and this calls for future 
studies.      
 
Our study finds no significant difference in performance for banks with or without 
foreign minority ownership. The finding is not in line with the expectations that foreign 
investors are expected to bring not only much needed capital but also advanced 
operational and managerial skills (such as skills in financial risk management). Our 
explanations are: (1) banks may undertake more investment and prudential practices in 
pursuing long-term benefits at the expense profitability in the short term; (2) it simply 
needs more time to transfer those skills and to realise benefits; and (3) the upper limit of 
foreign minority ownership may restrict foreign owners’ ability to influence banks’ 
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operational decision making processes thereby hampering the transfer of those expected 
benefits. This is an area that policy makers should pay more attention to and future 
research should follow up.   
 
Although agency theory suggests that the separation between ownership and 
management induces agency costs due to the possible conflicts in their interests, we find 
that banks with more dispersed ownership structure are more efficient. Moreover, all 
risks under consideration have significant adverse impacts on bank profitability except 
for capital risk that has no significant impact. Banks with higher credit risk, market risk 
and liquidity risk are more inefficient. Banks have become more efficient as time passes 
and a favourable macroeconomic environment helps banks improve performance.  
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics (1997, 2008)  
  1997 2008 
  Mean SD Max Min Mean SD Max Min 
Profit 34 51 178 1 125 271 1253 5 
Gross Loans 2744 5239 17920 1 4146 8553 34752 2 
Other Earning Assets 1311 2391 9179 6 3859 8565 38593 4 
Total Deposits 3225 5968 20219 1 6627 14710 62506 4 
Equity 156 268 870 2 500 1076 4633 26 
Total Assets 4437 8180 26379 8 8342 17730 74164 8 
Price of labour 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Price of fund 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Note: all variables in RMB billion except for input prices. All variables at 1995 price level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Estimation of the alternative profit frontier 
 
Alternative profit frontier   
Gamma （
222
uvu σσσγ +≡
） 0.86*** 
Sigma-squared （
222
uv σσσ +≡
） 0.55*** 
Log likelihood function  -318 
LR test of one-sided error 238 
Mean cost efficiency 0.61 
Notes: ‘***’ signifies significance at 1 % levels 
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Table 3 Results of the inefficiency effect model 
 
   Profit efficiency 
The nature of owners 
JSCB ( 1δ )  0.97*** 
SOCBs ( 2δ )   2.1*** 
FB ( 3δ ) 
  
-0.56* 
For-Minority ( 4δ )  -0.01 
The concentration of ownership 
LIST ( 5δ ) 
   
-0.36** 
Risk taking indicators 
Capital Risk ( 6δ ) 
   -0.05 
Credit Risk ( 7δ )  
 0.07* 
Market Risk ( 8δ ) 
  0.21*** 
Liquidity Risk ( 9δ ) 
   0.22*** 
Other controlling variables   
 t  ( 10δ ) 
   -0.27*** 
GDP ( 11δ )   -0.92*** 
Notes: (1): FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-owned commercial 
bank, For-Minority=domestic banks with foreign minority ownership; LIST=bank listed on stock 
exchange; (2): *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively; 
(3): Negative sign of the estimated coefficient indicates that the particular variable has a positive effect on 
cost or profit efficiency and vice versa. 
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Figure 1 Mean profit efficiency level (1995-2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Mean profit efficiency by bank types (1995-2008) 
 
Notes: （1）CCB = city commercial bank, FB=foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, 
SOCB = state-owned commercial bank.  
